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For decades, researchers studying small-scale, subsis-
tence-oriented farmers have sought to explain why these
“peasants” seem slow toacquirenewtechnologies,novel
agricultural practices, and new ideas from the larger so-
cieties that have engulfed them. The early work on this
question suggested that this “cultural conservatism” re-
sulted from things like a rigid adherence to tradition or
custom (Hoffman 1996), a cognitive orientation toward
a “limited good” (Foster 1988), or ignorance and lack of
education. In response to such explanations, much of the
subsequent debate on this issue has focused on showing
that this seeming conservatism actually results from ra-
tional cost-beneﬁt analysis in which individuals make
risk-averse decisions because of their uncertain and pre-
carious economic situations (e.g., Turner 1996, Netting
1993, Gladwin 1979,O r t i z1979, Schluter and Mount
1976, Scott 1976, Norman 1974, Johnson 1971, Wharton
1971, Lipton 1968). To inform this approach, we have
combined comparative experimental ﬁeld studies with
economically oriented ethnography among two groups
of small-scale farmers, the Mapuche of Chile and the
Sangu of Tanzania. Our experiments, which were de-
signed to measure risk preferences directly, indicate that
both the Mapuche and Sangu are risk-preferring(notrisk-
averse) decision makers in the standard economic
sense—suggesting that subsistence farmers more gen-
erally may not be risk-averse either. Furthermore, while
sex, age, land holdings, and income do not predict risk
preferences and wealth is—at most—only marginally
predictive, what does seem to predict risk preferences in
our monetary gambles is “cultural group.” Although
such experimental ﬁndings carryimportantcaveats,they
suggest that standard views of risk-averse decision mak-
ing may not be the best theoretical tools for understand-
ing “peasant conservatism” or the behavioral patterns
often attributed to “rational risk aversion.”
Our discussion proceeds as follows: First, we sketch
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two standard models of risk preferences that seek to cap-
ture what researchers mean when they describe behavior
as “risk-averse.” Second, we introduce the ethnographic
ﬁeld sites where the experimental and ethnographic re-
search was performed and describe the methods used.
Third, we report the basic experimental results. Fourth,
we examine our results in light of the standard ap-
proaches to risk and discuss some caveats and challenges
to interpreting our experimental risk data. Finally, we
brieﬂy introduce a theoretical alternative to generalized,
risk-averse cost-beneﬁt decision making that can gen-
erate patterns of adaptive risk-managing behavior with-
out requiring individuals to make complex, risk-averse
calculations.
what researchers mean by “risk aversion”
Many economic anthropologists have used the term
“risk aversion” without deﬁnition, in imprecise ways,
or in ways that may deviate from its standard usage in
economics textbooks (Cashdan 1990, Chibnik 1990).
Consequently, in order to clarify exactly how our evi-
dence addresses previous work on risk and peasants, we
have delineated two categories that seek to capture the
ways in which anthropologists and peasant researchers
have employed “risk aversion.”
Decreasing marginal utility. Economists have at-
tempted to capture the concept of risk aversion by for-
malizing the idea that as individuals get more and more
of something they value each additional increment less
and less. If we were giving you eggs, you might value
the ﬁrst two or three eggs quite highly (especially if you
are planning breakfast), the 6th and 7th a bit less, and
the 49th and 50th hardly at all. Mathematically, econ-
omists describe such individuals as having concave util-
ity functions—as their wealth increases, the additional
value (additional “utility”) of an additional unit of
wealth decreases. In this approach, individuals select
among alternative practices or options by computing the
expected utility associated with each option and then
choosing the one with the higher expected utility. When
at least one of the choices presents variable (risky) out-
comes, individuals who are maximizing expected utility
will sometimes make choices that offer lower average
incomes but less income variation because their utility
curves give greater values to initial gains than to sub-
sequent gains. From this perspective, farmers are risk-
averse because of the concave shape of their utility
curves. In contrast, risk-neutral farmers would have
straight-line utility curves and always prefer the option
with higher expected income/wealth. Risk-prone farm-
ers would have convex utility curves (accelerating up-
ward instead of decelerating downward) and prefer op-
tions with more variation, even when the expected
income from a high-variance option is less than from a
low-variance option. Although this approach has been
developed primarily by economists, anthropologistscon-
tinue to make use of it (e.g., Kuznar 2001, Winterhalder,
Lu, and Tucker 1999).
Risk and uncertainty. Many economists (e.g., KnightVolume 43, Number 1, February 2002 F 173
1921) and anthropologists (e.g., Chibnik 1990, Cancian
1989) have worried about the difference between riskand
uncertainty (or ambiguity). Traditionally, risk involves
known probabilities, such as the chance of getting
“heads” on ﬂipping a coin. In contrast, uncertainty in-
volves choices with unknown probabilities, such as the
chances of ﬁnding a book entitled The Internet’s Swan
Song in the library today. In the real world, pure risk and
absolute uncertainty are two poles of a continuum, and
we are almost always somewhere in the middle. Even in
coin ﬂipping, where the probabilities of the two out-
comes seem “known,” there is always some unknown
chance that the coin is a trickcoinorunbalancedbecause
of random variation in minting or design differences. At
the other end of the continuum, in sowing a novel seed,
for example, farmers at least know how similar seeds
usually perform and what the upper and lower bounds
of production are, so they are never completely uncer-
tain. This continuum can incorporated into the expected
utility framework described above, as long as individuals
compute subjective probabilities or probability distri-
butions based on what they know and then use these to
maximize their expected utility. As we will show, our
data indicate that Mapuche farmers treat risky and un-
certain bets in similar ways (cf. Cancian 1989) and that
wealth predicts neither risk nor ambiguity preferences.
Satisﬁcing or safety-ﬁrst. Researchers have also hy-
pothesized that farmers, nonhuman animals, and for-
agers make decisions (i.e., select among alternative ac-
tions) in order to minimize their chances of falling below
some subsistence minimum—which may be culturally
or biologically deﬁned, depending on the researcher
(Winterhalder 1990; Winterhalder, Lu, and Tucker 1999;
Real and Caraco 1986; Johnson 1971; Schultz 1964:31).
Intuitively, these well-studied models proposethatwhen
individuals face a choice between economic strategies,
they will select the strategy that gives them the lowest
probability of falling below some “subsistence thresh-
old” or “economic minimum,” regardlessoftheexpected
yields generated by alternative strategies. For example,
suppose that a farmer must choose between two crops,
a traditional crop that provides a very reliable yield (with
little variation) and a green-revolution technology that
produces a higher average yield but is quite sensitive to
ﬂuctuating local conditions and the nuances of farmers’
techniques (thus producing more variation in yieldsfrom
year to year). Depending on the details, “safety-ﬁrst”
farmers may prefer the lower-yielding but more reliable
traditional crop because the green technology’s higher
variation in yields may increase their chances of not be-
ing able to feed their families. Such models predict that
wealthier individuals—those above the subsistence
threshold—should be risk-averse while those below the
threshold should be risk-seeking. These models are com-
mon both in studies of risk-sensitive foraging (Stephens
and Krebs 1986) and in the analysis of capital assets and
portfolio composition (Nicholson 1995). Roumasset
(1976) has a discussion directly related to farming risk.
ethnographic context
Before digging intothe researchmethodologyandresults,
we provide a brief ethnographic sketch of the three cul-
tural groups discussed. We assume that the reader is suf-
ﬁciently familiar with the lifeways of the fourth group,
undergraduates at the University of California, Los An-
geles, that no ethnographic description is warranted.
The Mapuche.This descriptionoftheMapuchederives
from Henrich’s work in the farming communities ofCar-
rarren ˜i, Cautinche, and Huentelar, around the ruraltown
of Chol-Chol. In this cool, wet, Mediterranean climate,
Mapuche households live on widely scattered farms that
range in size from 2 to 38 hectares, with an average size
of around 9 hectares. All households practice a form of
three-ﬁeld cereal agriculture using steel plows and two-
ox teams. Most households subsist primarily on wheat
(consumed in the form of bread), but many also produce
oats, used only as animal feed. Households supplement
their diets with seasonably available vegetables (e.g., to-
matoes, onions, garlic, and chiles), legumes (e.g., peas,
lentils, and beans) and livestock (chickens, cows, horses,
sheep, and pigs), as well as some store-bought foods (e.g.,
salt, sugar, rice, noodles). Cash income tobuythesefoods
and other goods such as cooking oil, chemical fertilizers,
and school supplies derives from a number of other
sources, including (listed in decreasing degree of impor-
tance) selling livestock (mostly cows and pigs), selling
lumber (fast-growing pines and eucalyptus trees), per-
forming part-time wage labor, and selling cottage crafts
(often traditional Mapuche clothing).
Mapuche households are socially and economically
quite independent. Although goods are frequently ex-
changed between neighboring households (which are al-
most always recognized as kin in some fashion), these
are usually straight cash-for-goods transactions, though
interest-free credit is readily extended. Families buy
meat, vegetable seed, and homemade wine (pulco) from
one another. Labor is most commonly exchanged recip-
rocally between friends and relatives.Grouplaborparties
or mingacos, traditionally used during planting and har-
vesting, have become quite rare, except among elderly
households. Land is rarely bought or sold (and it is now
illegal for a Mapuche to sell land to a non-Mapuche).
However, many land-poor households sharecrop on the
land of neighboring Mapuches, though land is never
rented. Sharecroppers receive access to one or two hec-
tares of land for a year in exchange for 50% of the yield.
If chemical fertilizers or other inputs are employed, the
costs are split 50/50.
The Huinca. The Mapuche commonly use the term
“Huinca” to refer to the non-Mapuche Chileans who
inhabit the lands and towns that surround them. We
have adopted this term to distinguish the Mapuche from
the non-Mapuche inhabitants of the small, rural town
of Chol-Chol. We used the Huinca as a control group
with regard to inﬂuences of the regional economy and
the local environment. All the Huinca in the studygroup
grew up in Chol-Chol. Most work in low- or minimum-
wage jobs, often in construction, on road crews, or as174 F current anthropology
well-diggers and painters. A few were older high-school
students or “preuniversity” students, although no one
was younger than 17 years. Although the Huinca and the
Mapuche have intermixed, interacted, intermarried, and
interbred for hundredsof years,theHuinca/Mapuchedis-
tinction remains quite salient throughout the region.
Everyone knows and agrees on who is a Huinca and who
is a Mapuche.
The Sangu. The Sangu are agro-pastoralists in south-
western Tanzania. They originated from Bantu peoples
that intermixed in the region during the late 1800s and
early 1900s, when they united under a hereditary chief
and began raiding their neighbors for wealth and live-
stock (Shorter 1972, Wright 1971). Most now live in sed-
entary agricultural communities, where farmers produce
corn (and some rice) and raise cattle on an average parcel
of one acre for an average family of six people. Cattle are
the greatest measure of wealth, though some farmers do
sell rice (which they then use to buy corn). Wage work
is very scarce and desirable. Until recently, the Sangu
have had little market contact, but now they use the
market to sell grain and buy most living and farming
supplies.
There is great diversity in lifestyle among the Sangu.
Since 1997, McElreath has been working with two Sangu
communities: Utengule and Ukwaheri. Utengule resi-
dents live in very closely spaced settlements, with
homes often less than 10 m apart, and the vast majority
of households farm corn and rice and own no livestock.
A small number make a living off transport between
Utengule and the road (about 10 miles) or by selling im-
ported goods in the market. Most people under 25 years
of age in Utengule have had some primary schooling,
and many of them can read and write at a basic level.
Ukwaheri (“place of blessings”) is less a town or village
than a region of interrelated communities.Ukwaherilies
about 35 km north and east of Utengule, in the dryregion
of the plains. Household compounds are very scattered:
distances of 1–2 km are the norm. Most residents own
some livestock, and those with larger herds (typically 1
20 cattle) practice transhumance. Access to markets is
much more restricted in this area, and family sizes can
be considerably larger than in Utengule, as wealthy herd-
ers marry as many as ﬁve or six wives, each mothering
an average of four or ﬁve surviving children. Very few
people of any age in Ukwaheri region can read or write
anything beyond their own names.
methods and results
We conducted two binary-choice lottery experiments:
the titration experiment, with Mapuche, Huinca, and
Sangu, and the variance experiment, with Mapuche,
Sangu, and University of California, Los Angeles,
undergraduates.
The titration experiment. The titration experiment is
designed to compute the certainty equivalent or indif-
ference point for a risky option. By asking participants
to choose among a series of binary choices involving
some sure amount of money (option A) and a ﬁxed risky
bet (option B), one can home in on the approximatepoint
at which participants become indifferent between a ﬁxed
amount of money and a risky bet and thereby assign a
value to the risky option (the ﬁxed amount value p the
“certainty equivalent”). Risk-neutral expected-value
theory predicts that this certainty equivalent will be the
expected value of the risky option. The point above1,000
pesos at which respondents switch to preferring the sure
thing determines their indifference point and provides a
measure of their risk preference. If, for example the risky
bet is a 50% chance at 2,000 pesos (and 50%a t0 pesos),
then risk-neutral individuals should be indifferent be-
tween 1,000 pesos with certainty and this 2,000-peso
gamble. Risk-averse individuals will prefer the 1,000-
peso option over the 2,000-peso gamble. In contrast,risk-
seeking people will prefer the risky bet and not become
indifferent until the sure bet rises above 1,000 pesos
(higher than the expected value of the risky bet). Econ-
omists and psychologists have performed many such ex-
periments with university undergraduates and generally
found them to be moderately risk-averse (e.g., Holt and
Laury 2000).
Here we discuss the procedure using the peso amounts
for the Mapuche. The money amounts used in the Ma-
puche/Huinca and Sangu experiments were equivalent
to one-third of a day’s wage (the expected value of the
risky gamble) in the local economy. Our experimental
procedure used a sequence of three binary choices (A or
B) to estimate an individual’s indifference point. First,
Mapuche and Huinca participants faced a choice be-
tween 1,000 pesos (40% of a day’s wage) for sure (option
A) and a 50% chance at 2,000 pesos (and a 50% chance
at 0). (The corresponding choices for Sangu participants
were 400 shillings and a 50% chance at 800 shillings.)
If the participant picked the risky bet (option B) in the
ﬁrst round, we would “sweeten” option A in the next
round by increasing it from the 1,000 pesos to1,500(with
option B remaining the same). If the participant picked
the safe bet (option A) in round 1, we would “sour” op-
tion A, reducing it to 500 pesos—the idea being to
“sweeten” or “sour” the safe bet until the participant
switched from the risky to the safe bet or vice versa.
Round 2 was administered much like round 1. If the
participant picked the risky bet on round 2, we would
increase the value of the safe bet by 300 pesos in round
3 (to either 1,800 or 800, depending on the participant’s
previous choices). If the participant picked the safe bet
on round 2, we would decrease the value of option A to
either 1,300 or 300 pesos—again depending on the pre-
vious choices. Indifference points were recorded as the
amount halfway between the sure bet in round 3 and the
nearest known decision point. For example, if a partic-
ipant picked A in round 1, round 2 became a choice
between 500 pesos for sure and a 50% chance of 2,000
pesos. If the participant then picked B, round 3 became
a choice between 800 pesos for sure and the 2,000-peso
gamble. If the participant then picked B again, the in-
difference point was recorded as 900 pesos (he picked A
when it was 1,000 pesos and B when it was 800 pesos).
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table 1
Regression of Economic Variables on Indiffer-
ence Points for Mapuche and Huinca Datasets
Combined







a 0.63 ! 0.0001
aDichotomous variables. For sex, male p 1; for cultural
group, Mapuche p 1, Huinca p 0.
Fig. 1. Results of the titration experiment for Huinca
(n p 25) and Mapuche (n p 26).
coin for any risky bets and Henrich paid them the total
amount owed. (McElreath, working with Sangu, played
the bets as participants made their choices and paid after
each round.) When all rounds were complete, we inter-
viewed participants about why they had made particular
choices.
Figure 1 shows the results of the titration experiment
for the Mapuche and Huinca. The horizontal axis gives
the eight possible indifference points between zero and
2,000 pesos. The vertical axis is the frequency of indi-
viduals who arrived at each indifference point. Risk neu-
trality would lead to an average of 1,000 (the expected
value of the 2,000-peso gamble is 1,000 pesos). Compar-
ing Mapuche farmers with their Huinca neighborsshows
that Mapuche are risk-prone relative to both risk neu-
trality and the relatively risk-averse Huinca. Most Ma-
puche indifference points are well above 1,000, although
a few Mapuche are quite risk-averse. The mean indif-
ference point for the Mapuche is 1,400 pesos (with stan-
dard deviation of 474). This means that, on average, Ma-
puche farmers are indifferent between 1,400 pesos and a
50% chance of 2,000 pesos. In contrast, over 80%o f
Huinca indifference points are below 1,000 pesos and
therefore risk-averse. The mean indifference point for
the Huinca is 790 pesos (with standard deviation of 354).
The Mapuche and Huinca data are very unlikely to arise
from the same underlying distribution (Mann-Whitney
test, p ! 0.0001). Regression analyses yield a similar ﬁnd-
ing. Table 1 shows the results ofamultivariateregression
analysis on the Mapuche and Huinca titration dataset.
This linear model includes age, sex, head of household
(as a dummy variable), and cultural group (Mapuche p
1, Huinca p 0). It shows that, controlling for these other
variables, cultural group is the only large and well-es-
timated predictor of risk preferences. However, it re-
mains unclear exactly which of the many differences
between the Huinca and Mapuche our cultural-group
variable represents. These data indicate that the differ-
ence does not arise from differences in the controlled
variables, wealth or income (see below), but the cultural-
group variable may be picking up differences related to
occupation (farming versus wage labor), settlement pat-
tern (town versus scattered households), or primary
school education. Research is currently under way to
explore these possibilities.
The above ﬁndings are consistent with previous ex-
perimental work using a large sample (n p 175) of U.S.
undergraduates, business-school students, and univer-
sity faculty using a similar methodology. Holt and Laury
(2000) found that age, sex, income, and wealth failed to
predict any signiﬁcant proportion of the variation in risk
preferences across their high-stakes sample. The only
individual-level variable that did predict high-stakes risk
preferences, controlling for age, sex, wealth and income,
was “being Hispanic” (mostly Cubans from Miami),
which predicted substantially less risk aversion. This re-
sult is similar to our ﬁndings regarding the cultural-
group variable, although all these subjectswereveryrisk-
averse compared with the Mapuche.
The Sangu titration data reveal similar patterns.Sangu
are risk-prone in an absolute sense and compared with
Huinca, although slightly less risk-prone than Mapuche.
Standardizing to the expected value of the risky game,
the mean indifference point for the Sangu is 1.37 (stan-
dard deviation 0.56), compared with 1.4 (1,400/1,000)f o r
Mapuche and 0.79 for the Huinca. As for U.S. students,
Huinca, and Mapuche, neither sex nor age predicts risk
preference (see table 2). (Wealth and income effects are
discussed below.)
Kuznar (2001) employs a method somewhat similar to
our titration experiment and shows Andean Aymara pas-
toralists to be risk-averse. His method has twoimportant
differences, however. First, instead of real money he uses
hypothetical stakes that may fail to focus informants’
attention on the economic issues of the experiment. In-
stead, when actual economic stakes are 0 (hypothetical),
all kinds of other concerns come to predominate in the
decision process. Informants may be concerned with
what the ethnographer will think of them or what other
people will infer about them from their decisions. We
put large stakes on the line to focus the informants’ at-
tention on the game payoffs rather than on exogenous176 F current anthropology
table 2
Regression of Economic Variables on Indifference Points for Mapuche, Huinca, and
Sangu Datasets Separately
Economic Variable
Mapuche (n p 24)
Std. b (p Value)
Huinca (n p 24)
Std. b (p Value)
Sangu (n p 42)
Std. b (p Value)
Total land owned 0.065(0.83)– –
Age 0.26(0.32) 0.075(0.78) 0.23(0.17)
Sex












social concerns. This does not by any means eliminate
such exogenous factors, but it should reducetheirimpact
on decision making and give us a better chance at mea-
suring risk aversion (as opposed to, for example, what
the informant thinks the ethnographer wants him to
say). Further, Holt and Laury (2000) have demonstrated
that hypothetical risk-measuring methods yield quite
different results from those found in identical paid ex-
periments. For this reason, the use of hypotheticalstakes
is considered unacceptable in experimental economics
(Hertwig and Ortmann 2001). Second, Kuznar uses live-
stock amounts instead of money gambles, and it is pos-
sible that different currencies tap into different sets of
decision rules.
The variance experiment. The basic structure of the
variance experiment is similar to that of the titration
experiment. The goal of the experiment is to explorehow
variation in outcomes inﬂuences economic decisions
when the expected value of the options is the same. The
expected value (average return) of both options in all four
rounds is the same (1,000 pesos for Mapuche, 400 shil-
lings for Sangu, and $15 for the undergraduates). What
varies across rounds is the variance in outcomes.
In round 1, participants faced a choice between (in the
case of the Mapuche) 1,000 pesos for sure and a 50%
chance of 2,000 pesos. (The corresponding choices for
Sangu participants were 400 shillings and a 50% chance
at 800 shillings, for the university undergraduates $15
and a 50% chance of $30.) A coin was used to illustrate
and generate a 50/50 chance. In round 2, participants
chose between 1,000 pesos for sure and a 20% chance of
5,000 pesos (and an 80% chance of 0). In round 3, par-
ticipants selected either 1,000 pesos for sure or an 80%
chance of 1,250 pesos. In rounds 2 and 3, probabilities
were illustrated using ﬁve cards (four with X’s and one
with a Z; the Sangu received red and blue cards in the
same proportions instead). To play, participants selected
one card. Round 4 had two possibilities: (1) 1,000 pesos
for sure or a 5% chance of 20,000 pesos (and a 95%
chance of nothing) and (2) 1,000 pesos or an “unknown
chance” of 5,000 pesos. To illustrate the “unknown
chance,” a new stack of cards was brought out, and par-
ticipants were instructed that “some cards in the stack
have X’s (winners) and some are blank, but you don’t
know how many of each are in the stack”—this is an
ambiguous bet, as opposed to a risky bet. The Sangu and
the undergraduates receivedonlyriskybetsinthisround.
Figure 2 shows the frequency of risky bets (option B)
for each of the ﬁve possible gambles in our threedifferent
groups: the Mapuche, the undergraduates, and the Sangu.
The graph reveals substantial behavioral differences for
the highest-variance gambles, 20% and 5%. Given a
choice between 1,000 pesos for sure and a 20% chance
of 5,000 pesos, 78% of Mapuche preferred the risky op-
tion, while only 20% of the undergraduates took the
risky gamble (p p 0.00044). For the highest-variance
gamble, 67% of Mapuche and only 20% of the under-
graduates preferred the risky bet (p p 0.05). For the low-
est-variance bet, with an 80% chance of winning, Map-
uche were still signiﬁcantly more risk-seeking than the
undergraduates, who were approximately risk-neutral.
Over 80% of Mapuche and only 55% of the undergrad-
uates preferred the risky bet (p p 0.078).
2 Sangu risk
preferences generally paralleled the Mapuche.
3
The students’ strong preference for the risky bet when
the chances were 50/50 may at ﬁrst seem puzzling, de-
viating as it does from their preferences on both sides of
the 50/50 gamble and matching the preferences shown
by the otherwise risk-prone Mapuche and Sangu. This
strong preference of the students for 50/50 gambles rep-
licates previous ﬁndings in similar laboratory research
2. These p values are cumulative binomial probabilities that give
the chances of picking the undergraduate sample (or one withfewer
risky picks) via a random draw from a distribution matching the
combined Mapuche and undergraduate samples. If the undergrad-
uate samples are compared with the distribution matching the Ma-
puche only, then the p values for the 80%, 20%, and 5% bets are
0.0084, 5.78 # 10
8, and 6.22 # 10
5 respectively.
3. The Sangu results also provide a number of interesting puzzles,
but for our purposes what they conﬁrm is that another group of
small-scale, partially market-integrated, culturally distinct people
(living on another continent) behave quite similarlytotheMapuche
and quite differently from the students.Volume 43, Number 1, February 2002 F 177
Fig. 2. Frequency of risky gambles with different amounts of outcome variance. Sample sizes are n p 41 for
all Mapuche at 80%, 50%, and 20%, n p 12 for 5%, and n p 29 for unknown bet. For Sangu, n p 76 for 50%
and n p 38 for other bets. For students, n p 20 for 80%, 50%, 20%, and 5%.
(Edwards 1953, Coombs and Pruitt 1960). Coombs and
Pruitt (p. 273) suggest that their subjects may have pre-
ferred the 50/50 bets because “they are regarded as ‘fair
bets,’ and perhaps because they are simpler bets, more
easily comprehended than some of the others.” In part,
our postgame interviews and observations concur with
their suggestion. When Henrich asked participants why
they picked the risky bet on the 50/50 gamble, students
often respond with something like “50/50 is a good
chance” or “It’s fair.” However, in general, our evidence
runs counter to the proposal by Coombs and Pruitt that
participants understood the 50/50 gamble betterthanthe
other gambles. In round 1 of the titration experiments
which involved the same 50/50 gamble, only 16% of the
risk-averse Huinca picked the risky bet. This risk-averse
behavior is quite consistent with the Huinca’s generally
risk-averse behavior in the titration experimentandwith
the pattern of risk aversion shown by the students in the
variance experiment for the 20% and 5% gambles but
quite different from the strong preference shown by the
students in 50/50 gambles.
The bar at the far right of ﬁgure 2 shows the frequency
of Mapuche farmers’ taking the risky bet when they
faced a choice between a guaranteed 1,000 pesos and an
unknown chance at 5,000 pesos. Instead of displaying
the ambiguity aversion found among typicalstudentsub-
jects (Camerer and Weber 1992), the Mapuche preferred
this uncertain option over the certain option with about
the same frequency as they preferred theotherriskygam-
bles. This ﬁnding calls into question the idea that am-
biguity aversion is standard component of our species-
typical cognitive architecture (Rode et al. 1999). Perhaps
undergraduates learn, as a consequence of growing up in
a particular place, to fear uncertainty (and risk) in dealing
with money.
discussion
In the following discussion we explore the relationship
between economic/demographic variables and experi-
mentally derived risk preferences, examine our results
in light of the two risk models discussed earlier, present
alternative interpretations of our results, and address
some common concerns about methods and ﬁeld
measurement.
Economic/demographic variables. Although expected
utility maximization does not make any predictions
about the effect of wealth on risk preferences without
some further speciﬁcation of the shape of the utility
curve, many economists and economic anthropologists
have the intuition that wealthier individuals should be
more risk-prone. If wealth were an important variable,
then one might endeavor to explain the risk-preference
differences between these groups as a consequence of
their average differences in wealth. Without any further
analysis, it is clear that the intuition that wealthier
groups should be more risk-prone is not supported. To
the contrary, if we compare the Mapuche and the Sangu
with the undergraduates, the poorer groups are substan-
tially more risk-prone than the richer undergraduates.178 F current anthropology
table 3
Logistic Regressions Using Economic Demographic
Variables to Predict an Individual’s Likelihood of
Taking the Risky Bet in the Variance Experiment,
Round 1




Sex 0.18 1.27 0.89





Land 0.014 0.066 0.83
Sangu
Sex 0.32 0.6405 0.84
Age 0.014 0.0196 0.29
Cattle 0.0172 0.0184 0.11
Acres of corn 0.267 0.2138 0.20
Additionally, the students and the Huinca are both risk-
averse, but the Huinca are much poorer. Comparing the
wealth of the Huinca and the Mapuche is difﬁcult be-
cause the Mapuche have lower social status and less cash
on hand than the Huinca but more wealth in land and
animals. If land and animals can be converted into cash
(which they can but not easily or quickly), the Mapuche
are wealthier than the Huinca, However, both Mapuche
and Huinca consider the Mapuche poorer and lower in
social status.
Using the titration experiment data, table 2 shows the
standardized regression coefﬁcients and p values for a
series of economic variables regressed on indifference
points. For the Mapuche, age, sex, animal wealth per
household member, and total land (owned by the house-
hold) are used to predict indifference points. Animal
wealth per household member captures most of the
stored wealth possessed by households except for their
land (and land is difﬁcult to sell because Mapuche can
only sell to other Mapuche). None of these variables ex-
plain any signiﬁcant proportion of the variation in in-
difference points, although animal wealth per household
member is marginally signiﬁcant (using just animal
wealth makes the ﬁt worse). For the Huinca, sex, age,
and income fail to predict indifference points. Including
a dummy variable for head of household in these re-
gression models does not change the qualitative results.
Further, regression analyses on the Mapuche that in-
cluded numbers of cows, oxen, horses, and pigs as in-
dividual covariates yielded only negative results. In the
Sangu data, total acres of corn perhouseholdhasasizable
positive and marginally signiﬁcant effect, so a small pro-
portion of the variance in Sangu indifference points may
be due to differences in the availability of subsistence
(crop). However, many of the poorest members of the
sample remain more risk-prone than Western subjects
once wealth is accounted for, and if acres of corn are
divided by household size the effect disappears.
Similarly, in analyzing the variance experiment data,
we ﬁnd that economic and demographic variables do not
predict an individual’s likelihood of taking the risky
gamble (see table 3; later rounds are no different).
Our negative ﬁnding on the effect of wealth is consis-
tent with previous experimental work using peasants,
undergraduates, business-school students, and univer-
sity faculty. Binswanger and Sillers (1983:9), summariz-
ing risk experiments done among peasants in India (Bin-
swanger 1980), the Philippines (Sillers 1980), El Salvador
(Walker 1980), and Thailand (Grisley 1980), conclude
that “neither wealth nor income had a signiﬁcant effect
on observed choices [which varied in their riskiness],
despite large differences in the household wealth of re-
spondents.” Binswanger (1980) also found that tenant
farmers were more risk-prone than landowners, not, as
might be supposed, vice versa. Similarly, in both high-
and low-stakes risk experiments among undergraduates,
business-school students, and university faculty, Holt
and Laury (2000) found no effect of income or wealth
(controlling for age and sex) on risk preferences.
Additionally, among the Mapuche and the Sangu nei-
ther round number (1, 2, 3,o r4) nor gamble variance has
any measurable effect when examined in a ﬁxed-effects
regression. In contrast, the undergraduates were sub-
stantially less likely to take the risky bet as the variance
in outcomes increased and as round number increased.
Risk models. According to the standard economiccon-
ception of risk aversion—as decreasing marginal util-
ity—neither the Mapuche nor the Sangu are risk-averse.
In fact, they are both quite risk-prone, relative to both
expected-value theory and control populations. Taken at
face value, these experiments provide a direct challenge
to the standard approach to risk aversion. We address a
variety of mitigating interpretations below.
Unfortunately, our experiments do not confront the
safety-ﬁrst or satisﬁcing model as directly. Nevertheless,
the predictions from some interpretations of the satisf-
icing model are clearly not supported. This model pre-
dicts that individuals above some minimum threshold
should behave risk-aversely. If this threshold is some
physiologically deﬁned minimum level of subsistence,
then all four groups described in this paper as well above
it. No one was starving or seemed concerned about not
being able to obtain sufﬁcient food in the coming year.
If this is the case, then the Mapuche and the Sangu vi-
olate the risk-averse prediction of the safety-ﬁrst model,
while the Huinca and the students remain consistent
with it. Contrary to the prediction, if any group runs the
risk of falling beneath a minimum subsistence threshold
it is the risk-averse Huinca. If instead this threshold rep-
resents some local, culturally evolved standard of wealth
and success, then risk preferences within groups should
be predicted by some measure of individual wealth.
However, as we have seen, wealth does not predict ex-
perimentally measured risk behavior. Given these ﬁnd-
ings, the safety-ﬁrst approach does not shed much light
on our results. However, if Mapuche and Sangu are in-
cluding other groups in their assessment of who is high-
status, then very few individuals within these groups
may feel they are above the relevant threshold.Volume 43, Number 1, February 2002 F 179
Alternative interpretations. How are we to interpret
these ﬁndings in the light of the substantial evidence
(including our own) that a great deal of economic be-
havior is adaptive and does manage risk (Johnson 1971,
Norman 1974, Wolgin 1975, Ellis 1988,O r t i z1979, Rou-
masset 1976, Netting 1993)? We see two possibilities: (1)
Small-scale farmers are risk-averse, cost-beneﬁt decision
makers in most economic/agricultural domains but—
perhaps because of fun-seeking behavior or lack of ex-
perience with games—risk-prone in these particular
gambles—gambles that involve substantial sums of
money that could be used for food, fertilizer, and seed.
(2) Small-scale farmers, among others, rely on cultural
transmission mechanisms (e.g., social learning rules) to
acquire economic practices and contextually speciﬁc de-
cision-making heuristics that produce well-adapted risk-
averse behavior without any risk-averse decisionmaking
on the individual level.
In defending the ﬁrst possibility, some readers have
suggested that the Mapuche may lack sufﬁcient expe-
rience in situations suitable similar to these games to
apply their cost-beneﬁt, risk-averse decision making.
Perhaps experience with similar situations is a factor in
calibrating decision making. Unfortunately, we no com-
parative, quantitative data on different rates of exposure
to similar situations, but many Mapuche and Sangu have
experience in bingo, betting on board games (bao, among
the Sangu), charitable lotteries (“door prizes” at bingo),
and betting on horse races (Mapuche run their own), and
therefore it is not at all clear that Huinca and under-
graduates have more experience than they do withgames
of chance. And, although the Huinca have more expe-
rience in wage labor than the Mapuche and Sangu, the
dichotomous variable “having done wage labor” is not
a predictor of risk preferences in regression models for
either experiment. Finally, without a theory of how “ex-
perience” affects decision making it remains unclear to
us how such experience would lead to risk-averse, as
opposed to risk-neutral or risk-prone, decision making.
Risk aversion is not the “correct” (income-maximizing)
answer in these games; it is simply a matter of taste.
Others have suggested that risk-averse decision mak-
ers may prefer the risky gambles because they get some
“utility” or “fun” from playing them. Such individuals
would avoid the “sure thing” because they like ﬂipping
coins or picking cards. There are two problems with this
explanation, one empirical and the other theoretical.
Henrich has performed many three-choice lotteries with
both Mapuche and Huinca in which individuals had to
choose among three gambles that varied in their mean
returns and their variances. As in the experiments dis-
cussed above, Mapuche preferred the higher-variance
(risky) options signiﬁcantly more than the Huinca,
which suggests that fun in “playing” versus “not play-
ing” is not the answer—although it is possible to con-
struct a theory in which the amount of “fun” increases
with the size of the variance. Theoretically, such a “fun”
proposal is still saddled with explaining why human
groups vary in their preferences for “fun.” Why does
“fun” affect Mapuche and Sangu choices but not Huinca
and student ones? It would be interesting to repeat the
games with play money and see if anyone’s behavior
changed.
Another concern about the games focuses on differ-
ences in the way people may perceive “losses” versus
“gains.” Participants may receive more money than they
had at the start, but they cannot ﬁnish with less money
than they had at the start. We have several comments
on this point. First, perceiving the money as a “gain” is
merely a “framing effect.” In the variance experiment,
for example, we could have given Mapuche participants
4,000 pesos on one day and returned the next week to
administer the game. In this case, participants would
have had to put down 1,000 pesos (or choose not to) for
a chance at winning the various gambles. The payoff
structure of this version of the game would have been
identical to the one we actually used; it just “looks”
different. This is not, of course, to belittle framing ef-
fects; in fact, we think that framing effects are often the
most important variable. Second, from the point of view
of the standard model of risk aversion in economics,
framing effects should be irrelevant, so our criticism of
that model stands. Third, we think that the decisions in
our model bear some resemblance—in terms of the fram-
ing of gains and losses—to the actual cropping decisions
that farmers make. In our games, farmers face a choice
between a sure gain and a high-variance gain. Similarly,
in selecting a particular wheat seed for sowing the fol-
lowing year, farmers often face a choice between their
traditional seed (which approximates a “sure thing”) and
high-tech seed that may produce a higher yield (bigger
gain) but, if not dealt with properly, may yield substan-
tially less. Sowing either seed will provide a “gain” rel-
ative to not planting (even in a bad year, ﬁelds usually
yield something). Consequently, in terms of gains and
losses, we think that these frames are somewhat similar
for the participants. Finally, even if something about the
gains-versus-losses framing did affect the results, the
question remains why this framing affected different
populations in different ways. If framing-as-gains made
the Mapuche and Sangu risk-prone, why didn’t it also
make the Huinca and the students risk-prone?
The second possibility, that small-scale farmers rely
on cultural transmission mechanisms to acquire eco-
nomic practices and contextually speciﬁc decision-mak-
ing heuristics and not on a generalized, risk-averse cost-
beneﬁt decision-making process (as is often assumed in
economically oriented anthropology), is consistent with
a substantial amount of research from across the social
sciences indicating that people solve problems by cul-
turally acquiring the strategies, practices, mental mod-
els, beliefs, and preferences of others (Henrich n.d.). If,
for example, people relyon prestige-biasedculturaltrans-
mission (Boyd and Richerson 1985, Henrich and Gil-
White 2001), in which they preferentially copy the be-
haviors, decision-making heuristics, ideas, and beliefs of
prestigious or “successful” people, then quite sensible
and adaptive behaviors that would effectively manage
risk in the economically precarious context of peasants
would spread without anyone’s applying generalized180 F current anthropology
risk-averse decision analysis. Such a process wouldequip
farmers with context-speciﬁc heuristics or rules of
thumb (Henrich n.d.), which may embody some notion
of risk aversion or satisﬁcing and thus generate risk-
averse decisions in certain situations but actually bear
little resemblance to classical approaches to risk aver-
sion. In many economic contexts, small-scale farmers
who persistently deployed risky practices would even-
tually experience catastrophic losses that would create
a severe drop in their prestige (or their apparent degree
of “success”) if they managed to survive. Such results
would stiﬂe the spread of these risk-prone practices and
any othertransmissibletraitsoftheseunsuccessfulfarm-
ers. In contrast, farmers whose practices or context-spe-
ciﬁc heuristics effectively managed risk and consistently
avoided disastrous or catastrophic consequences would
gradually accumulate wealth, wives, and children. This
success would lead to prestige, which would cause their
practices and cultural traits to spread more vigorously
than those of others. In cultural evolutionary time and
in response to historical circumstances, this process
would diffuse risk-managing practices throughout the
population without anyone’s doing risk-averse decision
making in the usual sense.
From this perspective, given that in many traditional
economies cash transactions,banking,credit,andmoney
management either are relatively new or have neverbeen
crucial to economic success (this is certainly true for the
Mapuche and the Sangu), we should not expect cultural
selection processes such as prestige-biased transmission
(Henrich et al. 2001) to have evolved adaptive rules or
preferences for dealing with such matters. For example,
there is little doubt that historical factors such as the
Huinca’s persistent exploitation of the Mapuche’s past
ignorance of land values (which pervades Mapuche sto-
ries) have been inculcated into Mapuche practices, be-
liefs, and heuristics (such as “Don’t buy on credit from
Huinca”) and consequently slowed the cultural evolu-
tion of rules for dealing with money. In contrast, Huinca
townspeople andtheundergraduatescomefromsocieties
in which cash transactions, banking, credit, and money
management have long been the key to economic pros-
perity and prestige. Consequently, we should expect
them to have acquired culturally evolved rules and pref-
erences about how to deal with money in risky situa-
tions, while we should expect the Mapuche and Sangu
to have developed similar rules for agriculture and herd-
ing instead. Kuznar (2001) in fact ﬁnds risk-averse be-
havior in a somewhat comparable group of Aymara pas-
toralists, although the hypothetical nature of the
gambles makes his results difﬁcult to compare directly
with our own.
But why should Mapuche and Sangu be risk-prone in
these money gambles? Given that gambling games are
prevalent and popular in many foraging groups through-
out the world, that big-money lotteries have rapidly
spread to most nations,thatrevolving-creditassociations
have spread throughout the “underdeveloped” world,
and that people can become addicted to gambling just as
they can to food, drugs, and sex, it could very well be
that humans have some predisposition toward taking
risky monetary gambles. Consequently, Westerners or
any cultural group that has long and intensely partici-
pated in a monetary economy are risk-averse in mone-
tary gambles because they have acquired, via social
learning, rules and preferences for dealing with risky
monetary situations. The students, for example, seemed
clearly tempted by the higher-payoff risky bets but be-
lieved that the “smart thing” wastotakethesuremoney.
Neither Mapuche nor Sangu possess such a belief. It
would be proﬁtable to see how such groups behave with
similar gambles for other currencies, such as livestock
(Kuznar 2001) or land.
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In 1996, three pieces of iron oxide and one of iron hy-
droxide (hematite and limonite) were recovered from the
archaeological site of Twin Rivers, central Zambia (Bar-
ham 1998). These minerals were described and their sig-
niﬁcance discussed as possible evidence for pigment
use—and, by extension, symbol use—in the Middle
Pleistocene. A speculative model was proposed that
linked the emergence of distinctive regional variants of
the Middle Stone Age in sub-Saharan Africa with lan-
guage-based cultural groups. Symbol use (in addition to
language) and ritual were the suggested mechanisms for
creating and maintaining group identities. For the model
to gain credibility, further evidence was needed for the
association of systematic pigment use with the earliest
Middle Stone Age industries. The four specimens from
Twin Rivers were an inadequate sample on which tobase
such a model, but the intact sections contained more
material that awaited excavation.When TwinRiverswas
excavated in July–August 1999, a substantially larger
sample of minerals was recovered, providing evidence
for the systematic collection and processing of pigments.
The proposed correlation between emerging regional
styles of tool making and symbol use is strengthened by
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